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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
which would measure up to the requirements of absolute privilege, but also
on the ground that there is "no apparent purpose to injure." Here the
court is clearly talking of qualified privilege, where it is necessary to dis-
prove malice. Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co. (1925) 163 Minn. 226, 203
N. W. 974.
Authorities referred to by the instant cases support only qualified privi-
lege. There are few cases referring to wills in particular as privileged docu-
ments. Appellate court in Hendricks v. Vitizens and Southern National
Bank, above, held that statements of the testator unnecessarily intimating
that plaintiff was illegitimate were not privileged. There is no reason why
libellous statements in a will, when falling within the limits of qualified
privilege, should not be defensible on this ground. Statements are quali-
fiedly privileged when made in good faith upon any subject matter in which
the party communicating has an interest or duty and the party communi-
cated to has a like interest or duty or when made for the protection of
private interests. Wise v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman and En-
gineers (C. C. A. Iowa 1918) 252 F. 961; Alexander v. Vann (1920)
180 N. C. 187, 104 S. E. 360; Berry v. City of New York Insurance Co.
(1923) 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290; Newell on Slander and Libel, (4th Ed.
1924) p. 415. The facts in the present case clearly fall under this inter-
pretation. But extending the defense of absolute privilege to them would
open wide the doors for future extensions to all documents which will
eventually figure in a court proceeding. The court, in introducing this
subject is only confusing further the law of qualified privilege which was
sufficiently confused before. The decision in Nagle v. Nagle is undoubtedly
good law, but the dicta are superfluous and perplexing.
J. H. W. '87.
TRIAL-INsTRuCTIoNs-DUTY TO REQUEST-The judge permitted a per-
sonal injury case to go to the jury after the plaintiff had failed to submit
any instruction other than one on the measure of damages. The defendant
objected and on appeal urged this to be error. Held, that it is within the
"inherent power and duty of the court to see to it that the jury be in-
formed as to the law of the case. Where prejudice results to the losing
party by reason of the court's failure so to do, and the appellant properly
saves the point, the judgment should be reversed and remanded. The de-
fendant, however, was not prejudiced in this case. Dorman v. East St.
Louis R. R. Co. (Mo. 1934) 75 S. W. (2) 854.
The instant case changes a rule of appellate practice which for years
had been firmly established in Missouri, one which has had an interesting
history. The early pronouncements of the Supreme Court were to the effect
that it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury on all principles of law
applicable to the facts in evidence. To refuse to do so was error. McKnight
and Bradley v. Wells (1821) 1 Mo. 13; Coleman v. Roberts (1821) 1 Mo.
97. This rule persisted until in Drunj and Wiseman v. White (1847) 10
Mo. 224 the court in considering a case submitted to the jury without in-
structions, held that it was too late to contend on appeal that the jury
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was improperly instructed, since the appellant had not requested the neces-
sary instructions. Eight years later, the legislature enacted a statute which
settled the law with regard to the necessity to request instructions. R.S.
Mo. 1855, sec. 47, c. 128, p. 1268; now R.S. Mo. 1929, sec. 967 which in
brief states that "... either party may request.., or the court may give
. . . instructions. . ." This, together with the subsequent court decisions,
established beyond doubt the rule that "mere non-direction is not error,"
that the court has no duty to give instructions unless the parties request
them. Tetherow v. St. Joseph and D. M. Ry. Co. (1888) 98 Mo. 74, 11
S. W. 310; Nolan v. Johns (1894) 126 Mo. 159, 28 S. W. 492; Minter V.
Bradstreet Co. (1903) 174 Mo. 444, 73 S. W. 668; Morgan v. Mulhall
(1908) 214 Mo. 451, 114 S. W. 4; Linkart v. Miller (Mo. 1932) 48 S. W.
(2) 867. Instructions which do not cover the whole case amount, in civil
caes, to non-direction. Wilson v. K. C. So. Ry. (1906) 122 Mo. A. 667, 99
S. W. 465.
The decision in the principal case is a decided reversal of the law in
Missouri defining the duty to instruct the jury, yet it cannot be said to be
unexpected. For the past twenty years the Supreme Court has been con-
demning the practice of submitting cases to the jury without instruction,
and has threatened the present action. See, Buchanan v. Rechner (1933)
338 Mo. 634, 62 S. W. (2) 1071; Lindart v. Miller, supra, Barr v. Nafziger
Bakery Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 423, 41 S. W. (2) 559; Brown v. Shepard Elev.
Co. (Mo. A., 1930) 23 S. W. (2) 1100; Denkman v. Prudential Fixture Co.
(Mo. 1926) 289 S. W. 591; Eversole v. Wabash Ry. Co. (1923) 249 Mo.
523, 159 S. W. 419. Perhaps the statute, supra, has hindered an earlier
expression of the rule which the court in the instant case lays down, with
little concern for the enactment of the legislature. On authority of In re
Richards (1933) 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2) 672, the court holds that the
rules of court emanate from the judiciary and not the legislature and that
the acquiescence by the court in the act of the legislature does not preclude
the court from changing rules of practice which are within its inherent
power.
The principal case has a further significance. Its advent signifies the
departure of Missouri from the prevailing view that non-direction is not
misdirection. Pennockc v. Diologue (1829) 27 U. S. 1; Tobish v. Cohen
(1932) 110 N. J. L. 296, 164 Atl. 415; Cunningham v. Cox (Cal. 1932) 15
Pac. (2) 169; National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Bradley (1932) 245
Ky. 311, 53 S. W. (2) 701; Masonite Corp. v. Lochridge (Miss. 1932) 140
So. 223; Advance Mach. Co. v. Jacobs (Idaho 1931) 4 Pac. (2) 657;
Buttitta v. Lawrence (1931) 346 Ill. 164, 178 N. E. 390; Ohusted v. Saber
(1930) 251 Mich. 688, 232 N. W. 353. This view obtains in England.
Ford v. Lacey (1861) 30 L. J. (Exch.) 351. The reason for the prevailing
view seems to be that the duty, if any, to present instructions should be
upon the attorneys, who have studied the facts and law in their case far
more than has the judge. See 2 Thompson on Trials (1912) sec. 2341.
Despite the evident soundness and apparent clearness of the majority rule,
there are a few states which foresee the evil of too few instructions to a
lay jury and, therefore, to avoid a lack of direction place the duty on the
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court to instruct concerning the law applicable to the evidence presented.
Schwaninger v. McNeeley & Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 447, 87 Pac. 514; Aubrey
-v. Jonson (1932) 45 Ga. Ap. 663, 165 S. E. 846; Clark v. Monroe County
Fair (1927) 203 Iowa 1107, 212 N. W. 163; Mahoney v. Gooch (1923) 246
Mass. 567, 141 N. E. 605; Blue Valley Bank v. Melburn (1930) 120 Neb.
421, 232 N. W. 777; Merrihew v. Goodspeed (1929) 102 Vt. 206, 147 AtI.
346; Milyak v. Phila. Transit Co. (1930) 300 Pa. 457, 150 At. 622.
It is submitted that Missouri has placed a duty upon the court not to
submit cases without proper instruction to the jury, and the further duty
upon the attorney for the plaintiff to request such direction of the judge.
Although Dornan -v. East St. L. Ry., supra, aims to correct the evil of
submitting a case on the single instruction defining the measure of damages,
nothing in the opinion seems to be limited to such cases. It would seem that
the rule operates in favor of all appellants who have been prejudiced by
any non-direction. It is well to note, nevertheless, that the court inter-
polates the dictum that "What and to what extent the same duty (to re-
quest instructions) devolves on the defendant need not now be discussed."
H. A. G. '35.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WORK RELIEF EMPLOYMENT.-The claimant,
a resident of Columbus, Ohio, applied to the municipality for relief and
received relief grocery orders. Subsequently he was given a "work card"
by the division of charities, placed on a special payroll of relief workers
and required to perform labor on an hourly basis beofre more food orders
would be given. Sec. 3493 G. C. Ohio provides that a recipient of relief
must work if able or will be declared a vagrant. Remuneration by weeks
alternated between cash and food orders, and such payments were charged
to a poor-relief bond fund. While engaged, under this arrangement, in
working for the street cleaning department the claimant was injured and
applied for compensation under the state Workmen's Compensation Act.
Held, the claimant was an employee of the municipality within the meaning
of the act, the court thus overruling the workmen's compensation com-
mission's denial of the claim. Industrial Commission of Ohio v. McWhorter
(Nov., 1934), -Ohio--, 193 N. E. 620.
Cases uniformly hold that a contractual relation of employer and em-
ployee is a condition of the applicability of Workmen's Compensation Acts.
Most of the decisions have held that no such relation exists in the case of a
relief worker. According to a recent case those on relief are wards of the
municipality entitled to its support, and their services, voluntarily offered,
help contribute to this support. Vaivida v. City of Grand Rapids (1933),
264 Mich. 204, 249 N. W. 826, 88 A. L. R. 707. Thus the voluntary indigent
worker is merely a recipient of public charity unable to enforce a con-
tractual right to payment and is, therefore, not an employee within the
meaning of workmen's compensation acts. McBurney v. Industrial Accident
Commission of Cal. (1934), 220 Cal. 124, 30 Pac. (2d) 414; Martin v.
Industrial Commission (Cal. App. 1934), 30 Pac. (2d) 527; Rico et al. v.
Industrial Commission (Cal. App. 1934), 30 Pac. (2d) 584; Los Angeles
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